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Abstract
Investment in emerging technologies is particularly challenging, since, apart from uncertainty in
revenue streams, firms must also take into account both policy uncertainty and the random arrival
of innovations. We assume that the former is reflected in the sudden provision and retraction of
a support scheme, which takes the form of a fixed premium on top of the output price. Thus, we
develop an analytical framework for sequential investment in order to determine how price, techno-
logical, and policy uncertainty interact to affect the decision to invest sequentially in successively
improved versions of an emerging technology. We show that greater likelihood of subsidy retraction
lowers the incentive to invest, whereas greater likelihood of subsidy provision facilitates investment.
However, embedded options to invest in improved technology versions raise the value of the invest-
ment opportunity, thereby mitigating the impact of subsidy retraction and making the impact of
subsidy provision more pronounced. Additionally, by allowing for sequential policy interventions,
we find that the impact of policy uncertainty becomes less pronounced as the number of policy
interventions increases.
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1. Introduction
Investment in emerging technologies is typically made in the light of technological uncertainty, which
is often reflected in the random arrival of innovations. Consequently, within an environment of
increasing economic uncertainty, the viability of private firms depends crucially on which technology
they adopt and when. For example, subsidies for renewable energy (RE) technologies fuelled a
boom in solar panel manufacturing in China and allowed solar production capacity to increase
significantly. Combined with the decrease in the price of silicon, the main component of traditional
solar panels, this reduced the competitive advantage of US companies, many of which either went
bankrupt or were purchased by Chinese companies (The New York Times, 2013). While various
papers analyse how investment in technological innovations is affected by price and technological
uncertainty (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; Chronopoulos & Siddiqui, 2015), insights on the interaction
of these features with policy uncertainty are not equally developed. In fact, in most cases, insights
are based on numerical or simulation methods, which are crucial for studying more complex settings,
but do not allow for analytical tractability. However, the latter is necessary for understanding the
implications of policy uncertainty for investment, for example, why the incentive to either accelerate
or postpone investment increases as the likelihood of subsidy retraction increases depending on
the specifications of a model (Adkins & Paxson, 2015; Boomsma & Linnerud, 2015). In turn,
this will also enable a better understanding of any implications resulting from the potential to
invest sequentially in more efficient technologies that become available at random points in time.
Hence, incorporating technological and policy uncertainty in an analytical framework for sequential
investment is crucial in understanding the optimal investment policy in sectors characterized by
high R&D activity.
Indeed, although emerging technologies often enjoy government support, the absence of a clear
policy framework, which is frequently reflected in the sudden provision or retraction of a support
scheme, discourages investment decisions. For example, although promises of 10% annual returns
boosted the Spanish solar industry in 2008, the subsequent reduction of subsidies at different
points in time increased producers’ reluctance to commit to future investments (The Economist,
2013). Similarly, although Siemens had decided to invest 160 million in offshore wind turbines, it
subsequently required that policy uncertainty is resolved and that the UK Government maintained
its commitments to RE subsidies (Financial Times, 2015). Furthermore, empirical research based
on small hydropower projects has indicated that uncertainty regarding future subsidy provision
increases the incentive to postpone investment. In fact, even promises to include existing projects
in a prospective support scheme may not be as successful in promoting investment decisions as
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policymakers may expect (Linnerud et al., 2014).
Despite recent attempts to incorporate policy uncertainty within real options models, insights
involving the combined impact of price, technological, and policy uncertainty are limited, as these
features are frequently analysed in isolation. We address this disconnect by incorporating these
features in a real options framework for sequential investment in technological innovations. Thus,
we provide insights not only on how price, policy, and technological uncertainty interact to affect
the optimal investment policy, but also on how policymakers can devise more efficient policy mecha-
nisms in order to incentivise investment in emerging technologies. The scope of our model does not
include the option to choose between alternative projects (Grenadier & Weiss, 1997; Chronopoulos
& Siddiqui, 2015), but emphasises on how price, policy, and technological uncertainty interact to
affect sequential investment decisions. Our results indicate that greater likelihood of subsidy retrac-
tion (provision) postpones (accelerates) investment, while increasing number of policy interventions
lower the impact of policy uncertainty on the propensity to invest. Additionally, the option to invest
sequentially in improved versions of a technology raises the value of the investment opportunity,
and, thus, may either mitigate the impact of policy uncertainty or make it more pronounced. These
results have important implications for the current policymaking process in many countries that
seek to stimulate investment in RE power plants. Indeed, many countries implement a variety of
policy interventions and selective support schemes, without taking into account particular features
of investment projects or considering that private companies may act more cautiously in the light
of the uncertainties emerging from frequent switches between policy regimes.
We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2 and introduce assumptions and no-
tation in Section 3. In Section 4.1, we address the problem of optimal investment timing taking
into account only price and technological uncertainty. We introduce policy uncertainty in Section
4.2 and 4.3 in the form of sudden retraction and provision of a subsidy, respectively. In Section
4.4, we allow for the sudden provision of a retractable subsidy, and, in Section 4.5 we allow for
infinite provisions and retractions. Section 5 presents numerical results for each case, while Section
6 concludes the paper and offers directions for further research.
2. Related Work
The seminal work of McDonald & Siegel (1985) and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) has spawned
a substantial literature in the area of investment under uncertainty. A strand of this literature
illustrates the amenability of real options theory to emerging technologies and the energy sector
(Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza 2003; Rothwell, 2006; Siddiqui & Fleten, 2010; Lemoine, 2010).
Nevertheless, analytical formulations of problems that address investment in RE projects typically
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do not combine crucial features such as price, policy, and technological uncertainty. Indeed, most
of this literature either addresses the impact of technological uncertainty on investment decisions
ignoring the implications of policy uncertainty (Majd & Pindyck, 1987; Schwartz and Zozaya-
Gorostiza, 2003) or allows for policy uncertainty without taking into account the sequential nature of
investment in emerging technologies (Boomsma et al., 2012; Adkins & Paxson, 2015). Consequently
models that incorporate price, technological, and policy uncertainty in analytical frameworks for
sequential investment in technological innovations remain somewhat underdeveloped.
In the area of investment under policy uncertainty, Boomsma et al. (2012) develop a real
options model in order to investigate how investment behavior is affected by regulatory uncertainty
as well as changes of support scheme. They show that the value of an investment opportunity
under policy uncertainty is greater than under RE certificate trading, which is higher than under
a premium feed-in tariffs. In the same line of work, Boomsma & Linnerud (2015) find that the
prospect of subsidy retraction increases the rate of investment if it is applied to new projects,
while it slows down investment if it has a retroactive effect. Adkins & Paxson (2015) develop an
analytical model for investment under price, quantity, and policy uncertainty. The latter is reflected
in the random provision and retraction of a subsidy, which takes the form of a fixed premium on
quantity. Their results indicate that the prospect of a permanent subsidy retraction (provision)
facilitates (postpones) investment. Additionally, they find that the value of the option to invest
increases as the correlation between the price of electricity and quantity of electricity produced
increases, since this raises the aggregate volatility. Chronopoulos et al. (2016) ignore quantity
uncertainty, yet allow for discretion over capacity and sequential policy interventions. They find
that the greater likelihood of a subsidy retraction may facilitate investment, yet results in smaller
projects. Although these papers address the impact of policy uncertainty on investment timing
and capacity sizing decisions, they ignore the implications of technological uncertainty and how
sequential investment opportunities may impact the optimal investment policy.
Examples of analytical frameworks for sequential investment under uncertainty include Majd
& Pindyck (1987), who show how traditional valuation methods understate the value of a project
by ignoring the flexibility embedded in the time to build. Dixit & Pindyck (1994) develop a model
for sequential investment assuming that the value of the project depreciates exponentially and that
the investor has an infinite number of investment option. In the same line of work, Gollier et
al. (2005) compare a sequence of small nuclear power plants with a single nuclear power plant of
large capacity. Their results indicate that the value of modularity may even trigger investment
in the initial module at an electricity price level below the now-or-never net present value (NPV)
threshold. By comparing a lumpy to a stepwise investment strategy, Kort et al. (2010) show that
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higher price uncertainty raises the attractiveness of the former by increasing the reluctance to make
costly switches between different stages.
Allowing for technological uncertainty, Balcer & Lippman (1984) find that the optimal timing
of technology adoption under infinite switching options is influenced by expectations about fu-
ture technological changes and that increasing technological uncertainty tends to delay adoption.
Grenadier & Weiss (1997) develop a model for sequential investment in order to study how the in-
novation rate and technological growth impact the optimal technology adoption strategy, and find
that a firm may adopt an available technology even though more valuable innovations may occur
in the future. Farzin et al. (1998) assume that technological innovations follow a Poisson process
and find that the NPV rule can be used as an investment criterion in most cases. By contrast,
Doraszelski (2001) identifies an error in Farzin et al. (1998) and shows that a firm will always defer
investment when it takes the value of waiting into account. Huisman & Kort (2004) analyze how
technological uncertainty impacts the competitive equilibrium and find that when technological
uncertainty becomes sufficiently large, the competition changes from a preemption game into a war
of attrition. Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015) develop an analytical framework for sequential in-
vestment and analyze how the endogenous relationship between price and technological uncertainty
impacts the optimal technology adoption strategy and the associated investment rule. While these
papers present a comprehensive modeling of investment in technological innovations, they ignore
the implications of policy and technological uncertainty for sequential investment.
In this paper, we develop a real options framework for sequential investment under price, policy,
and technological uncertainty. In line with Adkins & Paxson (2015), we assume that the output
price follows a geometric Brownian motion, while technological innovations and policy uncertainty
follow independent Poisson processes that are not affected by price uncertainty. Nevertheless, our
results deviate from those of Adkins & Paxson (2015), since we show that greater likelihood of
subsidy retraction lowers the incentive to invest (Boomsma et al., 2015), whereas greater likelihood
of subsidy provision facilitates investment. This happens because, like Boomsma et al. (2015),
we assume that the impact of policy uncertainty on the value of the project is governed by an
exponential distribution without being subject to a linear approximation, and, therefore, is more
pronounced. Additionally, we find that, although an embedded option to invest in a more efficient
technology may mitigate the impact of policy uncertainty in the case of sudden subsidy retraction, in
the case of subsidy provision, the opportunity for sequential investment makes the impact of policy
uncertainty more pronounced. Finally we find that, under infinite provisions and retractions, the
impact of policy uncertainty is less pronounced and diminishes when the rate of policy interventions
increases.
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3. Assumptions and Notation
We consider a price-taking firm with a perpetual option to invest in n = 1, 2 successively im-
proved versions of a technology, each with infinite lifetime, facing price, technological, and policy
uncertainty. Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), we assume that technological and policy uncer-
tainty follow independent Poisson processes,
{
M
(i)
t , t ≥ 0
}
, where λi ≥ 0 denotes the intensity of
the Poisson process, t is continuous and denotes time, and i = {τ, p} (denoting technological and
policy uncertainty, respectively). Intuitively, M
(i)
t counts the number of random times ym ,m ∈ N
that occur between 0 and t, and Tm = ym − ym−1 is the time interval between subsequent Poisson
events. Furthermore, we assume that there is no operating cost associated with each technology and
that the output price at time t, Et, is independent of M
(i)
t and follows a GBM, which is described
in (1). We denote by µ the annual growth rate, by σ the annual volatility, by dZt the increment of
the standard Brownian motion, and by ρ ≥ µ the subjective discount rate.
dEt = µEtdt+ σEtdZt, E0 ≡ E > 0 (1)
We also denote the output of technology version n by Dn (D2 ≥ D1) and the corresponding
investment cost by In. We let a = 0, 1 denote the presence (a = 1) or absence (a = 0) of a subsidy
that can be provided and retracted b and c times, respectively. Thus, the time of investment
in technology version n is denoted by τb,cn,a, while ε
b,c
n,a is the corresponding optimal investment
threshold. For example, under sudden provision of a permanent subsidy, the optimal time to invest
in the second technology is τ1,02,0, while the corresponding optimal investment threshold is ε
1,0
2,0.
Finally, F b,cn,a (·) is the maximised expected NPV from investing in technology n, while Φb,cn,a (·) is
the expected value (NPV) of the active project inclusive of embedded options.
The firm’s value function at different states of operation is indicated in Figure 1 and is deter-
mined via backward induction. Therefore, we assume initially that the firm is operating the second
technology, and, thus, holds the value function Φb,c2,a(E). Prior to the adoption of the second tech-
nology, the firm is operating the first one holding a single embedded investment option, F b,c2,a(E),
which the firm will exercise at time τb,c2,a in order to obtain the value function Φ
b,c
2,a(E). Before the
arrival of the second technology, the firm holds the value function Φb,c1,a(E), which consists of the
expected value from operating the first technology and the embedded option to invest in the second
one, that has yet to become available. Finally, before time time τb,c1,a the firm holds an option to
invest in the first technology, F b,c1,a(E), with a single embedded option to invest in the second, that
has yet to become available.
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Figure 1: State transition diagram
4. Analytical Results
4.1. Benchmark Case: Investment without Policy Uncertainty
We assume that a firm has the option to invest in each technology facing only price and tech-
nological uncertainty. First, we assume that the firm is already operating the first technology and
holds a single embedded option to invest in the second one. The expected value of the revenues
from operating the second technology net of investment expenses is indicated in (2), where the first
term on the right-hand side is the expected revenues while the second term is the total investment
cost, which includes the cost of investment in the first technology.
Φ0,02,a(E) =
D2E (1 + ay)
ρ− µ − (I1 + I2) (2)
Next, the value of the option to invest in the second technology is indicated in (3). The first
two terms on the top part of (3) reflect the expected value of the profits from operating the first
technology, while the third term represents the option to invest in the second one. The bottom
part of (3) is the expected profits from operating the second technology and β1 > 1 is the positive
root of the quadratic 12σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − ρ = 0 (all proofs can be found the appendix).
F 0,02,a (E) =

D1E(1+ay)
ρ−µ − I1 +A0,02,aEβ1 , E < ε0,02,a
Φ0,02,a(E) , E ≥ ε0,02,a
(3)
The optimal investment threshold, ε0,02,a, and the endogenous constant, A
0,0
2,a, are obtained analyt-
ically by applying value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to the two branches of (3) and
are indicated in (4).
ε0,02,a =
(ρ− µ)β1I2
(β1 − 1) (D2 −D1) (1 + ay) and A
0,0
2,a =
(
1
ε0,02,a
)β1 (
(D2 −D1) (1 + ay) ε0,02,a
ρ− µ − I2
)
(4)
Next, we assume that the firm is operating the first technology holding an embedded option
to adopt the second, which has yet to become available. The dynamics of the value function
Φ0,01,a(E) are described in (5), where EE denotes the expectation operator that is conditional on
the initial output price E. The first term on the right-hand side of (5) represents the immediate
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profit from operating the first technology. As the second term indicates, with probability λτdt the
second technology will arrive and the firm will receive the value function F 0,02,a (E), whereas, with
probability 1− λτdt, no innovation will occur and the firm will continue to hold the value function
Φ0,01,a(E).
Φ0,01,a(E) = [D1E (1 + ay)− ρI1] dt + (1− ρdt)
{
λτdtEE
[
F 0,02,a (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ0,01,a(E + dE)
]}
(5)
By expanding the right-hand side of (5) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we can rewrite (5) as in (6), where A0,01,a ≤
0 and B0,01,a ≥ 0 are determined analytically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
between the two branches and δ1 > 1, δ2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic
1
2σ
2δ(δ − 1) + µδ −
(ρ+ λτ ) = 0. The first two terms on the top part of (6) represent the expected profit from operating
the first technology, while the third term is the option to invest in the second technology, adjusted
via the fourth term because the second technology has yet to become available. The first three
terms on the bottom part of (6) represent the expected profit from operating the second technology
and the fourth term the likelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region prior to the arrival
of an innovation.
Φ0,01,a(E) =

D1E(1+ay)
ρ−µ − I1 +A0,02,aEβ1 +A0,01,aEδ1 , E < ε0,02,a
(λτD2+(ρ−µ)D1)E(1+ay)
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) − λτ I2λτ+ρ − I1 +B
0,0
1,aE
δ2 , E ≥ ε0,02,a
(6)
Finally, the value function F 0,01,a (E) is indicated in (7), where the optimal investment threshold,
ε0,01,a, and the endogenous constant, C
0,0
1,a ≥ 0, are determined numerically via value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions between the two branches. The top part on the right-hand side of (7) is
the value of the option to invest, while the bottom part is the expected value from operating the
first technology inclusive of the embedded option to invest in the second.
F 0,01,a (E) =

C0,01,aE
β1 , E < ε0,01,a
Φ0,01,a(E) , E ≥ ε0,01,a
(7)
4.2. Permanent Subsidy Retraction
We extend the previous framework by assuming that a subsidy is available and that it may
be retracted permanently at a random point in time. If the subsidy lasts exactly T1 years, then
the expected value of the revenues of the project is EE
[∫∞
0
e−ρtD2Etdt+
∫ T1
0
e−ρtD2Etydt
]
=
D2E
ρ−µ +
D2Ey[1−e−(ρ−µ)T1 ]
ρ−µ . Since T1 ∼ exp(λp), evaluating the expectation of this expression with
respect to T1 and subtracting the investment cost we obtain (8). Notice that the subsidy will never
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be retracted if λp = 0, while greater λp raises the likelihood of subsidy retraction and lowers the
expected NPV of the project.
Φ0,12,1(E) =
D2E
ρ− µ +
∫ ∞
0
λpe
−λpT1D2Ey
[
1− e−(ρ−µ)T1]
ρ− µ dT1 − (I1 + I2)
=
D2E
ρ− µ +
D2Ey
ρ+ λp − µ − (I1 + I2) (8)
Next, we assume that the firm is operating the first technology and holds a single embedded
option to invest in the second. The dynamics of the firm’s value function are described in (9),
where the first term on the right-hand side reflects the immediate profit from operating the first
technology. As the second term indicates, the option to invest in the second technology will be
exercised in the permanent absence of a subsidy with probability λpdt, whereas, with probability
1 − λpdt, no policy intervention will take place and the firm will continue to hold the option to
invest in the second technology in the presence of a retractable subsidy.
F 0,12,1 (E) = [D1E(1 + y)− ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,02,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 0,12,1 (E + dE)
]}
(9)
By expanding the right-hand side of (9) using Itoˆ’s lemma and solving the resulting ordinary
differential equation, we obtain (10), where ε0,12,1 and A
0,1
2,1 ≥ 0 are determined via value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions, while η1 > 1, η2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic
1
2σ
2η(η − 1) +
µη − (ρ+ λp) = 0. The first three terms in the top part of (10) represent the expected profit from
operating the first technology. The fourth term is the option to upgrade to the second one in the
absence of a subsidy, adjusted via the fifth term since the subsidy is currently available.
F 0,12,1 (E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
D1Ey
ρ−µ+λp − I1 +A
0,0
2,0E
β1 +A0,12,1E
η1 , E < ε0,12,1
Φ0,02,1(E) , E ≥ ε0,12,1
(10)
Next, we step back and assume that an innovation has not taken place yet, but may occur over
an infinitesimal time interval dt with probability λτdt. The dynamics of the value function Φ
0,1
1,1(E)
are described in (11), where the first term on the right-hand side represents the immediate profit
from operating the first technology version, while the second term reflects the expected value in the
continuation region. Notice that if the subsidy is retracted with probability λpdt, then either an
innovation will take place with probability λτdt and the firm will receive the value function F
0,0
2,0 (E),
or no innovation will take place with probability 1 − λτdt and the firm will continue to hold the
value function Φ0,01,0(E). Similarly, if no policy intervention occurs with probability 1 − λpdt, then
the firm will either receive the value function F 0,12,1 (E) with probability λτdt, or it will hold the
value function Φ0,11,1(E) with probability 1− λτdt.
Φ0,11,1(E) = [D1E(1 + y)− ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdt
(
λτdtEE
[
F 0,02,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt) (11)
×EE
[
Φ0,01,0(E + dE)
])
+ (1− λpdt)
(
λτdtEE
[
F 0,12,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ0,11,1(E + dE)
])}
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The expression of Φ0,11,1(E) is indicated in (12), where A
0,1
1,1 ≤ 0 and B0,11,1 ≤ 0 are determined
numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, while θ1 > 1, θ2 < 0 are the roots
of the quadratic 12σ
2θ(θ − 1) + µθ − (ρ+ λp + λτ ) = 0. The first three terms in the top part
of (12) represent the expected profit from operating the first technology, while the fourth term
is the option to invest in the second one without policy uncertainty, adjusted by the fifth term
since the second technology has yet to become available. The two remaining option terms reflect
the necessary adjustment due to policy uncertainty. Also, the first four terms in the bottom part
of (12) represent the expected profit from operating the second technology, while the fifth term
represents the likelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region before the arrival of the second
technology, adjusted by the final term due to policy uncertainty.
Φ0,11,1(E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
D1Ey
ρ−µ+λp − I1 +A
0,0
2,0E
β1 +A0,01,0E
δ1 +A0,12,1E
η1 +A0,11,1E
θ1 , E < ε0,12,1
λτD2E+(ρ−µ)D1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
[λτD2+(ρ+λp−µ)D1]Ey
(ρ+λp−µ)(λp+λτ+ρ−µ) − λτ I2λτ+ρ − I1 +B
0,0
1,0E
δ2 +B0,11,1E
θ2 , E ≥ ε0,12,1
(12)
The dynamics of the option to invest in the first technology are described in (13). Notice that,
over an infinitesimal time interval dt, either the subsidy will be retracted with probability λpdt and
the firm will receive the option to invest in the absence of a subsidy, or no policy intervention will
take place with probability 1− λpdt and the firm will continue to hold the value function F 0,11,1 (E).
F 0,11,1 (E) = (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,01,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 0,11,1 (E + dE)
]}
(13)
The expression of F 0,11,1 (E) is indicated in (14), where ε
0,1
1,1 and C
0,1
1,1 can be obtained numerically via
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The first term in the top part of (14) is the option
to invest in the absence of a subsidy, adjusted by the second term since the subsidy is currently
available. The bottom part represents the expected value from operating the first technology
inclusive of the embedded option to invest in the second one.
F 0,11,1 (E) =

C0,01,0E
β1 + C0,11,1E
η1 , E < ε0,11,1
Φ0,11,1(E) , E ≥ ε0,11,1
(14)
Although ε0,11,1 and C
0,1
1,1 are obtained numerically, we can investigate the impact of λp and λτ
on the optimal investment rule by expressing F 0,11,1 (E) as in (15).
F 0,11,1 (E) =
(
E
ε0,11,1
)β1 [
Φ0,11,1
(
ε0,11,1
)
− C0,11,1ε0,1
η1
1,1
]
, E < ε0,12,1 (15)
The optimal investment rule is obtained by applying the first-order necessary condition (FONC) to
(15) and is indicated in (16), where we equate the marginal benefit (MB) of delaying investment to
the marginal cost (MC). The first two terms on the left-hand side consist of the stochastic discount
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factor multiplied by the incremental project value created by waiting until the price is higher.
These terms are positive, decreasing functions of the output price, as waiting longer allows the
project to start at a higher initial price, yet the rate at which this benefit accrues diminishes due
to the effect of discounting. The third term represents the reduction in the MC of waiting due to
saved investment cost. Similarly, the first two terms on the right-hand side reflect the opportunity
cost of forgone cash flows discounted appropriately. The fourth and third term on the left- and
right-hand side, respectively, reflect the loss in option value from not having the second version
yet. Specifically, the fourth term on the left-hand side is the MB from postponing the loss in value,
whereas the third term on the right-hand side is the MC from a potentially greater impact of the
loss from waiting for a higher threshold price. The final three option terms on both sides are all
corrections for policy risk in each state.(
E
ε0,11,1
)β1 [
D1
ρ− µ +
D1y
ρ− µ+ λp +
β1I1
ε0,11,1
− β1A0,01,0ε0,11,1
δ1−1 − β1A0,11,1ε0,11,1
θ1−1
+
[
β1C
0,1
1,1 + η1A
0,1
2,1
]
ε0,11,1
η1−1
]
=
(
E
ε0,11,1
)β1 [
β1D1
ρ− µ +
β1D1y
ρ− µ+ λp − δ1A
0,0
1,0ε
0,1
1,1
δ1−1 − θ1A0,11,1ε0,11,1
θ1−1
+
[
η1C
0,1
1,1 + β1A
0,1
2,1
]
ε0,11,1
η1−1
]
(16)
As shown in Proposition 1, greater likelihood of subsidy retraction lowers the MB by more than the
MC, thereby raising the incentive to postpone investment. Intuitively, the incentive to invest early
in order to take advantage of the subsidy for a longer period is mitigated by the rapid reduction in
the value of the active project.
Proposition 1. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimal investment threshold.
The relative loss in option value due to subsidy retraction is
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
. If λp = 0, then
the subsidy will never be retracted, and the relative loss in option value is zero. By contrast, as
λp increases, the relative loss increases, since C
0,1
1,1E
η1 → 0 ⇒ F 0,11,1 (E) → F 0,01,1 (E), as shown in
Proposition 2. Also,
C0,01,1−C0,01,0
C0,01,1
< 1, which implies that the relative loss in option value will always
be below one, since the firm can invest even in the absence of a subsidy.
Proposition 2.
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
∈
[
0, 1− 1
(1+y)β1
]
4.3. Provision of a Permanent Subsidy
As the increasing replacement of fossil-fuel with RE facilities may deteriorate the financial risk-
return performance of incremental investments (Mun˜oz and Bunn, 2013), subsidies may be required
to support green investments. Like in Section 4.2, we assume that there is a single policy interven-
tion, and, therefore, we denote the random time at which it takes place by T1. The expected NPV of
the project if the subsidy is provided at time T1 years is EE
[∫∞
0
e−ρtD2Etdt+
∫∞
T1
e−ρtD2Etydt
]
=
D2E
ρ−µ +
D2Ey[e−(ρ−µ)T1 ]
ρ−µ , and since T1 ∼ exp(λp), taking the expectation of this expression with respect
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to T1 we obtain (17).
Φ1,02,0(E) =
D2E
ρ− µ +
λpD2Ey
(ρ+ λp − µ) (ρ− µ) − (I1 + I2) (17)
The dynamics of the option to invest in the second technology are described in (18), where the first
term on the right-hand side represents the instantaneous profit from operating the first technology.
The second term indicates that, depending on the provision of a subsidy, the firm will receive either
the value function F 0,02,1 (E) with probability λpdt, or F
1,0
2,0 (E) with probability 1− λpdt.
F 1,02,0 (E) = [D1E − ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,02,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 1,02,0 (E + dE)
]}
(18)
The expression of F 1,02,0 (E) is indicated in (19), where ε
1,0
2,0, A
1,0
2,0 ≤ 0, B2,02,0 ≥ 0, and C1,02,0 ≥ 0,
are determined numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the three
branches. Note that, unlike the case of sudden subsidy retraction, F 1,02,0 (E) is now defined over
three different regions of E: (i) if E < ε0,02,1, then the firm would not invest even in the presence of
a subsidy, (ii) if ε0,02,1 ≤ E < ε1,02,0, then the firm would invest immediately if the subsidy is provided,
and (iii) if E ≥ ε1,02,0, then investment will take place immediately even in the absence of the subsidy.
F 1,02,0 (E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
λpyD1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ+λp−µ) − I1 +A
0,0
2,1E
β1 +A1,02,0E
η1 , E < ε0,02,1
λpD2E(1+y)+(ρ−µ)D1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) −
λpI2
λp+ρ
− I1 +B1,02,0Eη2 + C1,02,0Eη1 , ε0,02,1 ≤ E < ε1,02,0
Φ1,02,0(E) , E ≥ ε1,02,0
(19)
Next, the dynamics of the value function Φ1,01,0(E) are described in (20), where the first term
on the right-hand side reflects the instantaneous profit from operating the first technology. As
the second term indicates, within an infinitesimal time interval dt a subsidy will be provided
with probability λpdt and then the firm will receive either the value function F
0,0
2,1 (E) or Φ
0,0
1,1(E)
depending on the arrival of an innovation. By contrast, a subsidy will not be provided with
probability 1−λpdt, and, depending on the arrival of an innovation, the firm will receive either the
value function F 1,02,0 (E) or Φ
1,0
1,0(E).
Φ1,01,0(E) = [D1E − ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdt
(
λτdtEE
[
F 0,02,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ0,01,1(E + dE)
])
+ (1− λpdt)
(
λτdtEE
[
F 1,02,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ1,01,0(E + dE)
])}
(20)
Notice that (20) must be solved separately for each of the expressions of F 0,02,1 (E), Φ
0,0
1,1(E), and
F 1,02,0 (E) that are indicated in (3), (5), and (19), respectively. Like F
1,0
2,0 (E), Φ
1,0
1,0(E) is defined over
three different regions of E. Hence, following the same approach as in Section 4.2, we obtain the
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expression for Φ1,01,0(E) that is described in (21), where A
1,0
1,0, B
1,0
1,0 , C
1,0
1,0 and D
1,0
1,0 are determined via
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the three branches.
Φ1,01,0(E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
λpD1Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) − I1 +A
0,0
2,1E
β1 +A1,02,0E
η1 +A0,01,1E
δ1 +A1,01,0E
θ1 , E < ε0,02,1[
[λτD2+(ρ−µ)D1]
ρ−µ+λτ +
λτD2
ρ−µ+λp
]
λpE(1+y)
(ρ−µ)2
(
1+
λp+λτ
ρ−µ
) + D1Eρ−µ+λp
−
(
1
λτ+ρ
+ 1λp+ρ
)
λτλpI2
λp+λτ+ρ
− I1 +B1,02,0Eη2 + C1,02,0Eη1 +B0,01,1Eδ2
+B1,01,0E
θ2 + C1,01,0E
θ1 , ε0,02,1 < E < ε
1,0
2,0[
λp(1+y)
ρ−µ+λτ +
λpy
ρ−µ+λp + 1
]
λτD2E
(ρ−µ)2
(
1+
λp+λτ
ρ−µ
) +
[
λpy
(ρ−µ)
(
1+
λp+λτ
ρ−µ
) + 1
]
× D1Eρ−µ+λτ − λτ I2λτ+ρ − I1 +B
0,0
1,1E
δ2 +D1,01,0E
θ2 , E ≥ ε1,02,0
(21)
Finally, the dynamics of the option to invest in the first technology with a single embedded
option to upgrade to the second one are described in (22).
F 1,01,0 (E) = (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,01,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 1,01,0 (E + dE)
]}
(22)
The expression for F 1,01,0 (E) is indicated in (23), where ε
1,0
1,0, G
1,0
1,0, H
1,0
1,0 , and J
1,0
1,0 , are determined
numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The first term in the top branch of
(23) reflects the value of the option to invest in the presence of a subsidy, adjusted via the second
term due to policy uncertainty. The first two terms in the second branch represent the expected
value of the project if the subsidy is provided, while the third term is the option to invest in the
second technology, adjusted for technological uncertainty via the fourth term. The last two terms
reflect the likelihood of the price either dropping below ε0,01,1 or increasing beyond ε
1,0
1,0.
F 1,01,0 (E) =

C0,01,1E
β1 +G1,01,0E
η1 , E < ε0,01,1
λpD1E(1+y)
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) −
λpI1
ρ+λp
+A0,02,1E
β1 +
λp
λp−λτA
0,0
1,1E
δ1
+H1,01,0E
η2 + J1,01,0E
η1 , ε0,01,1 ≤ E < ε1,01,0
Φ1,01,0(E) , E ≥ ε1,01,0
(23)
Although it is not possible to express the value of the option to invest as in (15), we can analyse
the impact of λp on ε
1,0
1,0 by applying the FONC to the value matching condition between the bottom
two branches of (23), and, thus, obtain (24). The first term on the left-hand side represents the
extra benefit from allowing the project to start at a higher output price, the second term reflects
the reduction in the MC due to saved investment cost, and the third term the MB of being able
to not invest should the output price fall below the investment threshold, ε0,01,1. The first term on
the right-hand side is the MC of the forgone cash flows, while the second term is always positive
and represents the MC associated with the second technology not being available. The third term
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on the left-hand side reflects the increase in the MB of waiting due to the likelihood of a subsidy,
whereas the third term on the right-hand is the corresponding MC of waiting because the subsidy
is not available yet. The fourth term on the right-hand side is the MC of waiting, since the output
price might drop below the investment threshold prior to the arrival of an innovation.(
E
ε1,01,0
)η1 [
D1
ρ− µ+ λp +
η1ρI1
(ρ+ λp) ε
1,0
1,0
+ θ1A
1,0
1,0ε
1,0
1,0
θ1−1
+ (η1 − η2)H1,01,0ε1,01,0
η2−1
]
=
(
E
ε1,01,0
)η1 [
η1D1
ρ− µ+ λp −
(δ1 − η1)λτ
λτ − λp A
0,0
1,1ε
1,0
1,0
δ1−1
+ η1A
1,0
1,0ε
1,0
1,0
θ1−1
]
(24)
As shown in Proposition 3, greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowers the MB by more than the
MC, thereby decreasing the optimal investment threshold.
Proposition 3. Greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowers the optimal investment threshold.
The relative loss in option value due to policy uncertainty is
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 1,01,0 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
, and, unlike the
case of sudden subsidy retraction, decreases with greater λp. Indeed, for λp = 0 the subsidy will
never be provided and the relative loss in option value is maximised, whereas, it decreases with
greater λp, since the expected value of the project increases.
Proposition 4.
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 1,01,0 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
∈
[
1− 1
(1+y)β1
, 0
]
4.4. Provision of a Retractable Subsidy
Here, we assume that a subsidy that was provided at time T1 may be retracted at time T2.
The expected present value of the subsidy is EE
[∫ T2
T1
e−ρtD2Etydt
]
=
D2Ey[e−(ρ−µ)T1−e−(ρ−µ)T2 ]
ρ−µ and
since Tm ∼ exp(λp),m = 1, 2, the expected value from operating the second technology is indicated
in (25). Unlike (17), the subsidy will be available for a smaller time period, and, therefore, its
expected value is reduced, i.e.,
λp
(ρ−µ+λp)2 ≤
λp
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) .
Φ1,12,0(E) =
D2E
ρ− µ +
∫ ∞
0
λpe
−λpT1
∫ ∞
T1
λpe
−λp(T2−T1)D2Ey
[
e−(ρ−µ)T1 − e−(ρ−µ)T2]
ρ− µ dT2dT1 − (I1 + I2)
=
D2E
ρ− µ +
λpD2Ey
(ρ− µ+ λp)2
− (I1 + I2) (25)
Next, we assume that the firm operates the first technology version and holds a single embedded
replacement option. The latter, will either be exercised in the presence of a retractable subsidy
with probability λpdt, or in the absence of a subsidy that has yet to be provided with probability
1 − λpdt. Thus, the dynamics of the value function F 1,12,0 (E) are described in (26). Notice that
the ordinary differential equation that is obtained by expanding the right-hand side of (26) using
14
Itoˆ’s lemma must be be solved for each expression of F 0,12,1 (E), that is indicated in (10). Thus, the
expression for F 1,12,0 (E) is indicated in (D-1).
F 1,12,0 (E) = [D1E − ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,12,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 1,12,0 (E + dE)
]}
(26)
The dynamics of the value function Φ1,11,0(E) are indicated in (27), where the first term on
the right-hand side reflects the immediate profit from operating the first technology. The second
term indicates that either a subsidy will be provided with probability λpdt and then the firm will
either receive the value function F 0,12,1 (E) or Φ
0,1
1,1(E) conditional on the arrival of an innovation.
Alternatively, a subsidy will not be provided with probability 1−λpdt and contingent on the arrival
of the second technology version the firm will receive either the value function F 1,12,0 (E) or Φ
1,1
1,0(E).
Solving the differential equation that is obtained by expanding the right-hand side of (27) using
Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the expression that is indicated in (D-2).
Φ1,11,0(E) = [D1E − ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdt
(
λτdtEE
[
F 0,12,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ0,11,1(E + dE)
])
+ (1− λpdt)
(
λτdtEE
[
F 1,12,0 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ1,11,0(E + dE)
])}
(27)
Similarly, the dynamics of the value of the option to invest in the first technology version are
described in (28). Notice that, over an infinitesimal time interval dt, either the subsidy will become
available and the option will be exercised in the presence of a retractable subsidy, or no policy
intervention will take place and the firm will continue to hold the value function F 1,11,0 (E). Solving
(28) for each expression of F 0,11,1 (E) that is indicated in (14), we obtain (D-3).
F 1,11,0 (E) = (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F 0,11,1 (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F 1,11,0 (E + dE)
]}
(28)
As it will be shown numerically, the likely retraction of the subsidy after its initial provision
decreases the incentive to invest compared to a permanent subsidy provision. Intuitively, the
subsidy is less valuable, and, therefore, it is optimal to postpone investment.
4.5. Infinite Provisions and Retractions
Here, we assume that a subsidy is subject to infinite provisions and retractions. Taking into
account that
λp
(ρ−µ+λp)2 +
λ3p
(ρ−µ+λp)4 +
λ5p
(ρ−µ+λp)6 . . . =
λp
(ρ−µ+λp)2
/(
1− λ2p
(ρ−µ+λp)2
)
=
λp
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+2λp) ,
the expected value of the profits from operating the second technology version is indicated in (29).
Φ∞,∞2,0 (E) =
D2E
ρ− µ +
λpD2Ey
(ρ− µ) (ρ− µ+ 2λp) − (I2 + I1) (29)
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Next, we assume that the subsidy is initially available. In the first period we get the value of
a retractable subsidy, D2Ey(ρ−µ+λp) , and subsequently the subsidy has to be provided and retracted
similar to the previous case. The expected value becomes
(ρ−µ+λp)D2Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+2λp) , and the expected revenue
from operating the second technology is indicated in (30).
Φ∞,∞2,1 (E) =
D2E
ρ− µ +
(ρ− µ+ λp)D2Ey
(ρ− µ) (ρ− µ+ 2λp) − (I2 + I1) (30)
The dynamics of the option to invest in the second technology version are described in (31) for
a = 0, 1. The first term on the right-hand side indicates the instantaneous profit from operating
the first technology version, while the subsequent term represents the expected continuation value
if the subsidy is either provided or retracted.
F∞,∞2,a (E) = [D1E (1 + ya)− ρI1] dt + (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F∞,∞2,1−a(E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F∞,∞2,a (E + dE)
]}
(31)
Similarly, the dynamics of the firm’s value function when it operates the first technology version
holding a single embedded option to invest in the second one, are described in (32). The first term
on the right-hand side indicates the immediate profit from operating the first technology, while
the remaining represents the expected continuation value that depends on the arrival of the second
technology.
Φ∞,∞1,a (E) = [D1E (1 + ya)− ρI1] dt+ (1− ρdt)
{
λpdt
(
λτdtEE
[
F∞,∞2,1−a(E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt) (32)
×EE
[
Φ∞,∞1,1−a(E + dE)
])
+ (1− λpdt)
(
λτdtEE
[
F∞,∞2,a (E + dE)
]
+ (1− λτdt)EE
[
Φ∞,∞1,a (E + dE)
])}
Finally, the dynamics of the value functions in the initial state are indicated in (33).
F∞,∞1,a (E) = (1− ρdt)
{
λpdtEE
[
F∞,∞1,1−a(E + dE)
]
+ (1− λpdt)EE
[
F∞,∞1,a (E + dE)
]}
(33)
5. Numerical Results
For the numerical results we assume that ρ = 0.1, µ = 0.01, σ = 0.24, y = 0.1, I1 = 500,
I2 = 1500, D1 = 8, D2 = 16, and λp, λτ ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, the second technology covers
greater demand than the first one, yet is three time more expensive. Figure 2 illustrates the
impact of technological and policy uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold in the second
(left panel) and the first technology (right panel) under sudden subsidy retraction. Notice that the
threat of permanent subsidy retraction decreases the firm’s incentive to invest and raises the optimal
investment threshold, as shown in Proposition 1. Intuitively, this is a consequence of the functional
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form of the value of the active project. For example, in Adkins & Paxson (2015) the active project
is a linear function of λp, yet, in our paper, the impact of policy uncertainty on the value of the
active project is exponential. Consequently, the incentive to invest early in order to take advantage
of the subsidy for a longer period does not compensate the loss in project value due to subsidy
retraction. Nevertheless, the possibility to upgrade to a more efficient technology mitigates the
impact of policy uncertainty. This happens because the prospect of sequential investment increases
the value of the initial investment opportunity and mitigates the loss in option value due to subsidy
retraction. Additionally, greater price uncertainty raises the opportunity cost of investment, and,
in turn, the value of waiting, thereby increasing the incentive to postpone investment. These results
have important implications for both private firms and policymakers. Indeed, the former can take
into account the impact of policy uncertainty on the value of the project and the option to invest,
and, thus, make more informed investment and operational decisions, while, the latter, can devise
more effective policy mechanisms by taking into account how firms respond to policy uncertainty
in the light sequential investment decisions.
Figure 2: Impact of λp and λτ on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology
(right) under sudden subsidy retraction.
Unlike the case of sudden subsidy retraction, the left panel in Figure 3 illustrates that if a firm
holds a single investment option, then greater likelihood of subsidy provision accelerates investment,
as shown in Proposition 3. This result becomes more pronounced in the presence of an embedded
option to invest in a more efficient technology (right panel). Intuitively, a greater likelihood of
subsidy provision raises the value of the investment opportunity, and, in turn, the firm’s incentive
to invest. This implies that the rapid increase in project value due to subsidy provision mitigates
the firm’s incentive to wait for the subsidy to become available.
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Figure 3: Impact of λp and λτ on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology
(right) under sudden subsidy provision.
Figure 4 illustrates how the impact of policy uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold
can be decomposed with respect to the MB and MC of delaying investment. Notice that greater
likelihood of subsidy retraction lowers both the MB and the MC, yet the MC curve shifts down
by more than the MB curve, and, as a result, the two curves intersect at a higher threshold (left
panel). Intuitively, the extra cost from delaying investment is reflected partly in the loss due to the
absence of the second technology, which becomes more pronounced at a higher output price and
as the likelihood of subsidy retraction increases. By contrast, as the right panel illustrates, greater
likelihood of subsidy provision decreases both the MB and MC of delaying investment, yet the MB
decreases by more, thereby decreasing the marginal value of delaying investment, and, in turn, the
optimal investment threshold.
Figure 4: Impact of λp on the MB and MC of delaying investment for a permanent sudden retraction (left) and a
permanent provision (right), λτ = 0.02.
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The relative loss in option value due to sudden subsidy retraction and provision is illustrated in
the left and right panel of Figure 5, respectively. According to the left panel, greater likelihood of
subsidy retraction raises the relative loss in option value, as shown in Proposition 2, and this result
becomes more pronounced as the rate of innovation increases. By contrast, the right panel illustrates
that in the case of sudden subsidy provision the relative loss in option value decreases with greater
λp, as shown in Proposition 4. Again, this result becomes more pronounced as the rate of innovation
increases. This is in line with Propositions 1 and 3, as it implies that the incentive to postpone
(accelerate) investment increases with greater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision), and this
becomes more pronounced in the presence of embedded options. Notice also that the relative loss
in option value is never zero because the firm can always exercise an investment option whether a
subsidy is present or not, albeit at a higher price threshold.
Figure 5: Impact of λp and λτ on the relative loss in option value under sudden subsidy retraction (left) and provision
(right)
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the λp and λτ on the optimal investment threshold in the case of
provision of a permanent and a retractable subsidy. Notice that the likelihood of subsidy retraction
after its initial provision mitigates the impact of policy uncertainty on the optimal investment
threshold. More specifically, relative to the case of permanent subsidy provision, the likelihood that
the subsidy will be available temporarily decreases the investment incentive and raises the optimal
investment threshold. Nevertheless, as the right panel illustrates, the possibility to upgrade an
existing technology by adopting a more efficient version makes the impact of subsequent policy
interventions less pronounced.
The impact of λp and λτ on the optimal investment thresholds under infinite provisions and retrac-
tions is illustrated in Figure 7. Even though the optimal investment thresholds present a similar
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Figure 6: Impact of λp and λτ on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology
version (right) under sudden provision of a retractable subsidy.
behavior as in the case of permanent subsidy provision and retraction, increasing number of policy
interventions make the impact of policy and technological uncertainty less pronounced. Notice also
that the investment incentive is greater if the subsidy is currently available, i.e., a = 1. This hap-
pens because, due to discounting and policy uncertainty, the first policy intervention has a greater
impact on the expected value of the project and the investment decision. Additionally, the invest-
ment thresholds for a = 0 (the subsidy is initially absent) and a = 1 (the subsidy is initially present)
converge when the rate of policy interventions increases. In fact, as the right panel illustrates, this
convergence becomes more pronounced in the presence of embedded investment options.
Figure 7: Impact of λp and λτ on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology
(right) under infinite provisions and retractions.
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6. Conclusions
In an era of increasing uncertainty, firms in sectors such as energy, manufacturing, and telecom-
munications require managerial strategies that are responsive to market conditions. For example,
the implications of the structural transformation of the power sector for both market participants
and policymakers are considered to be crucial as they are expected to change substantially the
wholesale market dynamics (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Within this environment, private firms are
required to make accurate investment decisions, while policymakers must take into account how
private firms respond to different sources of uncertainty in order to incentivize investment. In this
paper, we develop a real options framework in order to investigate how price, policy, and technolog-
ical uncertainty interact to affect the decision to invest sequentially in an emerging technology. We
consider the case of sudden subsidy retraction, sudden provision of a permanent and retractable
subsidy, as well as infinite provisions and retractions. The results are pertinent to sectors such as
RE and R&D, that are subject to frequent policy interventions and where the rate of innovation is
high.
We show that greater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) decreases (increases) the in-
vestment incentive and postpones (facilitates) investment. Allowing for sequential investment op-
portunities mitigates the impact of policy uncertainty in the case of subsidy retraction but can
make the impact of policy uncertainty more pronounced in the case of sudden subsidy provision.
Additionally, increasing number of policy interventions mitigate the impact of policy uncertainty
on investment by reducing the expected value of the subsidy. Interestingly, the results indicate that
the impact of policy uncertainty on investment decisions depends crucially on how policy uncer-
tainty is reflected in the functional form of the value of the project. Indeed, a linear approximation
of the impact of policy uncertainty on the value of the active project implies that greater likelihood
of subsidy retraction (provision) increases (decreases) the investment incentive (Adkins & Paxson,
2015; Chronopoulos et al., 2016). By contrast, if the impact of policy uncertainty on the value of
the project is exponential, and, therefore, more pronounced, then the opposite result is observed,
i.e., greater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) postpones (accelerates) investment. Conse-
quently, understanding how the rate of policy interventions may influence the propensity to invest
is particularly crucial for the design of policies that aim to promote long-term investment decisions.
In order to relax the assumption of a GBM, other stochastic processes, e.g., mean-reverting
process or arithmetic Brownian motion, may be implemented within the same framework. Addi-
tionally, the current framework can be extended by investigating the interaction between price and
policy uncertainty via a two-factor model, whereby price and policy uncertainty are modelled via
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correlated geometric Brownian motions. Also, it would be interesting to include strategic inter-
actions via duopolistic competition and analyse how the presence of a rival may impact not only
investment but also capacity sizing decisions (Dangl, 1999). This will provide further insights on
how policy measures may enhance or reduce the competitive advantage of power plants depending
on their asymmetries, related to cost and operational flexibility. For example, a carbon-price floor
can influence the value of operational flexibility, thereby inducing investment in a RE facility by
decreasing the value of operational flexibility embedded in a commodity-based facility (Chronopou-
los et al., 2014). Moreover, allowing for the choice between two technologies would enable further
insights regarding the optimal technology adoption strategy under policy uncertainty.
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APPENDIX
A. Benchmark Case
The value function F 0,02,a (E) is described in (A-1).
F 0,02,a (E) = D1E (1 + ya) dt− ρI1dt+ (1− ρdt)EE
[
F 0,02,a (E + dE)
]
(A-1)
Using Itoˆ’s lemma, we expand the right-hand side of (A-1), and, thus, we obtain (A-2).
1
2
σ2E2F 0,0
′′
2,a (E) + µEF
0,0′
2,a (E)− ρF 0,02,a (E) +D1E (1 + ya)− ρI1 = 0 (A-2)
Notice that the solution of the homogeneous part of (A-2) is F 0,02,a (E) = A
0,0
2,aE
β1+B0,02,aE
β2 . However,
E → 0 ⇒ B0,02,aEβ2 → ∞, and, therefore, B0,02,a = 0. The expression for F 0,02,a (E) is indicated in (3),
where ε0,02,a and A
0,0
2,a, are determined analytically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
and are indicated in (4).
Next, the firm is operating the first technology version and holds an option to invest in the
second one. The dynamics of the value function are described in (5), and by expanding the right-
hand side of (5) using Ito’s lemma, we obtain (A-3)
1
2
σ2E2Φ0,0
′′
1,a (E) + µEΦ
0,0′
1,a (E)− (ρ+ λτ )Φ0,01,a(E) + λτF 0,01,a (E) +D1E (1 + ya)− ρI1 = 0 (A-3)
The endogenous constants A0,01,a and B
0,0
1,a are determined via value-matching and smooth-pasting
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between the two branches of (6) and are indicated in (A-4) and (A-5), respectively.
A0,01,a =
ε0,02,a
−δ1
δ2 − δ1
[
λτ (δ2 − 1) (D2 −D1) (1 + ya) ε0,02,a
(ρ− µ) (ρ+ λτ − µ) −
δ2λτI2
λτ + ρ
+ (β1 − δ2)A0,02,aε0,02,a
β1
]
(A-4)
B0,01,a =
ε0,02,a
−δ2
δ1 − δ2
[
λτ (1− δ1) (D2 −D1) (1 + ya) ε0,02,a
(ρ− µ) (ρ+ λτ − µ) +
δ1λτI2
λτ + ρ
− (β1 − δ1)A0,02,aε0,02,a
β1
]
(A-5)
B. Permanent Subsidy Retraction
Proposition 1. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimal investment threshold.
Proof: Notice that greater λp lowers the expected value of the project, thereby reducing both the
MB and the MC of delaying investment. Also, notice that the first five terms on the left-hand side
of (16) are less sensitive to changes in λp than the first four terms on the right-hand side, since
θ1 ≥ η1 ≥ β1 ≥ 1 and θ1 ≥ δ1 ≥ β1 ≥ 1. Next, we denote the last terms on the left- and right-hand
side by G = β1C
0,1
1,1 + η1A
0,1
2,1 and H = η1C
0,1
1,1 + β1A
0,1
2,1, respectively. If λτ = 0, then the ratio
between C0,11,1 and A
0,1
2,1 is equal to
[
(D2−D1)I1
D1I2
]η1 I2
I1
.
G = β1C
0,1
1,1 + η1A
0,1
2,1 =
[
β1 + η1
(
(D2 −D1) I1
D1I2
)η1 I2
I1
]
C0,11,1 (B-1)
H = η1C
0,1
1,1 + β1A
0,1
2,1 =
[
η1 + β1
(
(D2 −D1) I1
D1I2
)η1 I2
I1
]
C0,11,1 (B-2)
Note that
[
(D2−D1)I1
D1I2
]η1 I2
I1
< 1, which implies that ∂G∂λp <
∂H
∂λp
, and, in turn, that the MC decreases
by more than the MB. If λτ > 0, then both the MB and the MC of delaying investment increase
due to the embedded investment option, yet the impact of λτ only impacts C
0,1
1,1 , and, therefore,
the overall effect remains unchanged.
Proposition 2.
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
∈
[
0, 1− 1
(1+y)β1
]
Proof: The relative loss in option value is outlined in (B-3).
F 0,01,1 (E)− F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
=
(
C0,01,1 − C0,01,0
)
Eβ1 − C0,11,1Eη1
C0,01,1E
β1
(B-3)
Notice that λp = 0 ⇒ F 0,01,1 (E) = F 0,11,1 (E) ⇒
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
= 0. By contrast, as λp increases,
the relative loss increases since C0,11,1 → 0. Also, notice that ε0,02,1 =
ε0,02,0
1+y , A
0,0
2,1 = A
0,0
2,0 (1 + y)
β1 , and,
ε0,01,1 =
ε0,01,0
1+y . Thus, A
0,0
1,1 = (1 + y)
δ1 A0,01,0 and by substituting ε
0,0
1,1, A
0,0
1,1 and A
0,0
2,1 in the expression for
C0,01,1 , we obtain (B-4).
C0,01,1 = (1 + y)
β1 1
ε0,01,1
β1
(
D1ε
0,0
1,0
ρ− µ − I1 +A
0,0
2,0ε
0,0
1,0
β1
+A0,01,0ε
0,0
1,0
δ1
)
= (1 + y)β1 C0,01,0 (B-4)
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Hence,
C0,01,1
C0,01,0
= (1 + y)β1 , and, thus,
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 0,11,1 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
= 1− 1
(1+y)β1
C. Provision of a Permanent Subsidy
Proposition 3. Greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowers the optimal investment threshold.
Proof: If λτ = 0, then (24) can be rewritten as in (C-1), since θ1 = η1.(
E
ε1,01,0
)η1 [
D1
ρ− µ+ λp +
η1ρI1
(ρ+ λp) ε
1,0
1,0
+ (η1 − η2)H1,01,0ε1,01,0
η2−1
]
=
(
E
ε1,01,0
)η1 [
η1D1
ρ− µ+ λp
]
(C-1)
By inserting the expression for H1,01,0 =
1
(η1−η2)ε0,01,1
η2
(
(η1 − β1)C0,01,1ε0,01,1
β1 − (η1 − 1) λpD1ε
0,0
1,1(1+y)
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) +
η1
λpI1
ρ+λp
)
in (C-1), subtracting the left from the right-hand side, and taking the derivative with
respect to λp we obtain (C-2).
∂
∂λp
(η1D1(ρ− µ) + λpD1)
[
ε0,0
1−η2
1,1 (1 + y)− ε1,0
1−η2
1,0
]
(ρ− µ)(ρ− µ+ λp) +
η1ρI1
[
ε1,0
−η2
1,0 − ε0,0
−η2
1,1
]
ρ+ λp

+(η1 − η2)H1,01,0 log
(
ε1,01,0
ε0,01,1
)
∂η2
∂λp
< 0 (C-2)
Starting with the second term on the left-hand side of (C-2), we notice that:
∂
∂λp
η1
ρ+ λp
=
∂η1
∂λp
(ρ+ λp)− η1
(ρ+ λp)2
<
∂η1
∂λp
(ρ+ λp)−
√
ρ+λp
σ2
(ρ+ λp)2
< 0 (C-3)
And by inserting ∂η1∂λp =
1
σ2
√(
µ
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+
2(ρ+λp)
σ2
into the inequality ∂η1∂λp (ρ+λp)−
√
ρ+λp
σ2
< 0 we obtain
0 <
( µ
σ2
− 12
)2
+
(ρ+λp)
σ2
, which cannot be negative. Next, we take the partial derivative of the first
term on the left-hand side of (C-2) with respect to λp and we obtain (C-4).
∂
∂λp
η1D1(ρ− µ) + λpD1
(ρ− µ)(ρ− µ+ λp) =
D1
[
∂η1
∂λp
(ρ+ λp − µ)− η1 + 1
]
(ρ− µ)(ρ− µ+ λp)2 (C-4)
Similarly, we can show that ∂η1∂λp (ρ+λp−µ)−η1+1 < 0, and, that, ε
0,01−η2
1,1 (1+y)−ε1,0
1−η2
1,0 < 0. But
ε0,01,1(1 + y) = ε
0,0
1,0. The final term in (C-2) is negative because
∂η2
∂λp
< 0, while the other terms are
positive. Consequently, the MB of delaying investment decreases by more than the MC. If λτ > 0,
then both the MB and the MC of delaying investment increase due to the embedded investment
option, however, since policy uncertainty impacts the embedded investment option in the same
way, the overall effect is maintained.
Proposition 4.
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 1,01,0 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
∈
[
1− 1
(1+y)β1
, 0
]
Proof: Notice that the relative loss in option value when λp = 0 is
F 0,01,1 (E)−F 1,01,0 (E)
F 0,01,1 (E)
=
C0,01,1−C0,01,0
C0,01,1
,
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which, from Proposition 2, is 1− 1
(1+y)β1
. Furthermore, when λp increases the value of the adjust-
ment term, G1,01,0, approaches zero, and the relative loss is zero. Since
∂
∂λτ
G1,01,0 > 0 and G
1,0
1,0 ≤ 0 the
relative loss is decreasing when we increase λτ .
D. Provision of a Retractable Subsidy
By expanding the right-hand side of (26) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain an ordinary differential
equation, whose solution is indicated in (D-1). The first three terms in the top part of (D-1) reflect
the expected profit from operating the first technology. The third term represents the option to
invest in the second technology in the permanent absence of a subsidy, adjusted via the last term,
since the subsidy will be provided and subsequently retracted. The first four terms in the middle
branch represent the expected profit from operating the second technology, while the fifth term
represents the likelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region. The last term is the option
to upgrade to the second technology.
F 1,12,0 (E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
λpD1Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)2 − I1 +A
0,0
2,0E
β1 +
[
λpA
0,1
2,1
1
2σ
2−η1σ2−µ lnE +A
1,1
2,0
]
Eη1 , E < ε0,12,1
λpD2E+(ρ−µ)D1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) +
λpD2Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)2 −
λp
ρ+λp
I2 − I1 +B1,12,0Eη2 + C1,12,0Eη1 , ε0,12,1 ≤ E < ε1,12,0
Φ1,12,0(E) , E ≥ ε1,12,0
(D-1)
Similarly, by expanding the right-hand side of (27) using Itoˆ’s lemma and solving the resulting
ordinary differential equation for each expression of F 1,11,0 (E) that is indicated in (D-1), we obtain
(D-2). Note that A1,11,0, B
1,1
1,0 , C
1,1
1,0 and D
1,1
1,0 are determined by the value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions between the three branches.
Φ1,11,0(E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
λpD1Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)2 − I1 +A
0,0
2,0E
β1 +A0,01,0E
δ1 +A1,11,0E
θ1
+
λpA
0,1
1,1 lnE
1
2σ
2−θ1σ2−µE
θ1 +
(
λp
λτ
A0,12,1 +A
1,1
2,0
)
Eη1
+
λτλpA
0,1
2,1E
η1
(θ2−θ1)( 12σ2−η1σ2−µ) 12σ2
[
(η1−θ1) lnE−1
(η1−θ1)2 −
(η1−θ2) lnE−1
(η1−θ2)2
]
, E < ε0,12,1[
λτD2+(ρ−µ)D1
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
[λτD2+(ρ−µ+λp)D1]y
(ρ−µ+λp)(ρ−µ+λp+λτ ) +
λτD2
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp)
+ λτD2y
(ρ−µ+λp)2
]
λpE
(ρ−µ+λp+λτ ) +
D1E
(ρ−µ+λp) +B
0,0
1,0E
δ2 +
λpB
0,1
1,1 lnE
1
2σ
2−θ2σ2−µE
θ2
− (2ρ+λp+λτ )λτλpI2(ρ+λp+λτ )(ρ+λp)(ρ+λτ ) − I1 +B
1,1
2,0E
η2 + C1,12,0E
η1 +B1,11,0E
θ2 + C1,11,0E
θ1 , ε0,12,1 ≤ E < ε1,12,0
λτD2E+(ρ−µ)D1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
λp[λτD2+(ρ−µ+λp)D1]Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)(ρ−µ+λp+λτ )2 +
λpλτD2Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)2(ρ−µ+λp+λτ )
+B0,01,0E
δ2 +
λpB
0,1
1,1 lnE
1
2σ
2−θ1σ2−µE
θ2 − λτ I2λτ+ρ − I1 +D
1,1
1,0E
θ2 , E ≥ ε1,12,0
(D-2)
Finally, the expression for F 1,11,0 (E) is indicated in (D-3), where ε
1,1
1,0, G
1,1
1,0, H
1,1
1,0 , and J
1,1
1,0 are
determined by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the three branches. The first
term on the top branch of (D-3), is the option to invest in the permanent presence of a subsidy,
adjusted via the second term due to policy uncertainty. The second branch reflects the expected
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project value if the subsidy becomes available, and the bottom branch is expected project value
when the price is high enough so that investment is optimal even in the absence of a subsidy.
F 1,11,0 (E) =

C0,01,1E
β1 +
(
λpC
0,1
1,1
1
2
σ2−η1σ2−µ lnE +G
1,1
1,0
)
Eη1 , E < ε0,11,1
λpD1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) +
λpD1Ey
(ρ−µ+λp)2 −
λpI1
λp+ρ
+A0,02,0E
β1 − λpλτA
0,1
1,1E
θ1
+
λpA
0,1
2,1 lnE
1
2
σ2−θ1σ2−µE
η1 +
λp
λp−λτA
0,0
1,0E
δ1 +H1,11,0E
η2 + J1,11,0E
η1 , ε0,11,1 ≤ E < ε1,11,0
Φ1,11,0(E) , E ≥ ε1,11,0
(D-3)
E. Infinite Provisions and Retractions
By expanding the right-hand side of (31) using Itoˆ’s lemma and adding the differential equations
corresponding to a = 0, 1 we obtain f(E) = F∞,∞2,1 (E) + F
∞,∞
2,0 (E), whereas by subtracting them
we obtain f(E) = F∞,∞2,1 (E)− F∞,∞2,0 (E).
1
2
σ2E2f
′′
(E) + µEf
′
(E)− ρf (E) + 2D1E +D1Ey − 2ρI1 = 0 (E-1)
1
2
σ2E2f
′′
(E) + µEf
′
(E)− ρf (E)− 2λpf (E) +D1Ey = 0 (E-2)
If a = 1, then the expression of F∞,∞2,1 (E) is indicated in (E-3), where ξ is the solution to the
quadratic 12σ
2ξ(ξ − 1) + µξ − (ρ+ 2λp) = 0. The first two terms on the top part represent the
expected profit, while the last two terms is the adjusted value of the option to invest.
F∞,∞2,1 (E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
(ρ−µ+λp)D1Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+2λp) − I1 +A
∞,∞
2,1 E
β1 +B∞,∞2,0 E
ξ1 , E < ε∞,∞2,1
Φ∞,∞2,1 (E) , E ≥ ε∞,∞2,1
(E-3)
Similarly, if a = 0, then the expression of F∞,∞2,0 (E) is indicated in (E-4). The endogenous constants
A∞,∞2,1 , B
∞,∞
2,0 , C
∞,∞
2,0 , D
∞,∞
2,0 and the investment thresholds ε
∞,∞
2,1 , ε
∞,∞
2,0 are obtained numerically
numerically by value-matching and smooth-pasting between the branches in (E-3) and (E-4). The
first three terms in the top branch of (E-4) represent the expected value from operating the first
technology, while the fourth term is the value of the option to invest in the second technology,
adjusted via the fifth term due to policy uncertainty. The first four terms in the second branch,
represent the expected value of the project, while the last two terms represent the likelihood of the
price either dropping below ε∞,∞2,1 or rising above ε
∞,∞
2,0 .
F∞,∞2,0 (E) =

D1E
ρ−µ +
λpD1Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+2λp) − I1 +A
∞,∞
2,1 E
β1 −B∞,∞2,0 Eξ1 , E < ε∞,∞2,1
λpD2E+(ρ−µ)D1E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp) +
λpD2Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+2λp) −
λpI2
(ρ+λp)
− I1
+C∞,∞2,0 E
η2 +D∞,∞2,0 E
η1 , ε∞,∞2,1 ≤ E < ε∞,∞2,0
Φ∞,∞2,0 (E) , E ≥ ε∞,∞2,0
(E-4)
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Next, the dynamics of the firm’s value function before the arrival of the second technology are
described in (32) for a = 0, 1. By expanding the right-hand side of (32) using Itoˆ’s lemma we obtain
(E-5).
1
2
σ2E2Φ∞,∞
′′
1,a (E) + µEΦ
∞,∞′
1,a (E)− (ρ+ λp + λτ )Φ∞,∞1,a (E) + λpΦ∞,∞1,1−a(E) + λτF∞,∞2,a (E)
+D1E (1 + ya)− ρI1 = 0 (E-5)
Following a similar approach, we let φ(E) = Φ∞,∞1,1 (E) + Φ
∞,∞
1,0 (E). Notice that (E-5) has to be
solved for each expression of F∞,∞2,1 (E) that is indicated in (E-3), and, thus, the expression of φ(E)
is indicated in (E-6).
φ(E) =

(2+y)D1E
ρ−µ − 2I1 + 2A∞,∞2,1 Eβ1 +A∞,∞1,1 Eδ1 , E < ε∞,∞2,1
λτ (ρ−µ+2λp)D2E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λp)(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
[λτD2+(ρ−µ)D1]Ey
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
[λτ+2(ρ−µ+λp)]D1E
(ρ−µ+λp)(ρ−µ+λτ )
− λτ (ρ+2λp)(ρ+λp)(ρ+λτ )I2 − 2I1 −
λτ(C∞,∞2,0 E
η2+D∞,∞2,0 E
η1)
λp−λτ
+B∞,∞1,1 E
δ2 + C∞,∞1,1 E
δ1 , ε∞,∞2,1 ≤ E < ε∞,∞2,0
(2+y)D1E
(ρ−µ+λτ ) +
λτ (2+y)D2E
(ρ−µ)(ρ−µ+λτ ) − 2I1 − 2λτ I2ρ+λτ +D
∞,∞
1,1 E
δ2 , E ≥ ε∞,∞2,0
(E-6)
Similarly, we set φ(E) = Φ∞,∞1,1 (E) − Φ∞,∞1,0 (E), and the expression of φ(E) is indicated in (E-7).
Note that κ is the solution to the quadratic 12σ
2κ(κ− 1) + µκ− (ρ+ λτ + 2λp) = 0. Consequently,
Φ∞,∞1,1 (E) and Φ
∞,∞
1,0 (E) can be expressed as a linear combination of (E-6) and (E-7).
φ(E) =

D1Ey
ρ−µ+2λp + 2B
∞,∞
2,0 E
ξ1 +G∞,∞1,1 E
κ1 , E < ε∞,∞2,1[
D1y +
λτ [D2−D1]
(ρ−µ+λp) +
λτD2y
(ρ−µ+2λp)
]
E
ρ−µ+λτ+2λp −
λτρI2
(ρ+λp)(ρ+λτ+2λp)
−λτ [C
∞,∞
2,0 E
η2+D∞,∞2,0 E
η1 ]
λτ+λp
+H∞,∞1,1 E
κ2 + J∞,∞1,1 E
κ1 , ε∞,∞2,1 ≤ E < ε∞,∞2,0
D1Ey
ρ−µ+λτ+2λp +
λτD2Ey
(ρ−µ+2λp)(ρ−µ+λτ+2λp) +K
∞,∞
1,1 E
κ2 , E ≥ ε∞,∞2,0
(E-7)
Finally, the option to invest in the first technology is indicated in (E-8) for a = 1. The first
term in the top branch of (E-8) reflects the value of the investment opportunity, adjusted via the
second term since subsidy is currently available, while the bottom branch is the value of the active
project.
F∞,∞1,1 (E) =

L∞,∞1,1 E
β1 +M∞,∞1,0 E
ξ1 , E < ε∞,∞1,1
Φ∞,∞1,1 (E) , E ≥ ε∞,∞1,1
(E-8)
If a = 0, then the option to invest in the first technology is described in (E-9), and, like in Section
4.3 and 4.4, it is defined over three different regions of E. The first term on the top branch of (E-9)
is the option to invest, adjusted via the second term due to policy uncertainty. The second branch
reflects the value of the project provided that the subsidy becomes available, and the bottom branch
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is the expected value of the project if the price is sufficiently high so that investment would take
place even in the absence of a subsidy.
F∞,∞1,0 (E) =

L∞,∞1,1 E
β1 −M∞,∞1,0 Eξ1 , E < ε∞,∞1,1[
1+ y2
ρ−µ +
y
2(ρ−µ+2λp)
]
λpD1E
(ρ−µ+λp) −
λpI1
ρ+λp
+ 12A
∞,∞
2,1 E
β1 +
λpA
∞,∞
1,1 E
δ1
2(λp−λτ )
−B
∞,∞
2,0 E
ξ1
2 −
λpG
∞,∞
1,1 E
κ1
2(λp+λτ )
+N∞,∞1,0 E
η2 +O∞,∞1,0 E
η1 , ε∞,∞1,1 < E < ε
∞,∞
1,0
Φ∞,∞1,0 (E) , E ≥ ε∞,∞1,0
(E-9)
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